When Empire Comes Home: What Hong Kong and Brexit Tell Us About Who We Think We Are

Here's something that's been nagging at me: in 1997, Britain handed Hong Kong back to China. In 2016, Britain voted to leave the EU. Completely different events, right? But the more I look at the data, the more I realize both are fundamentally asking the same question: who gets to decide who "we" are?

The numbers on Hong Kong identity are striking. Before the handover, polls already showed most people there identified as "Hongkongese" rather than "Chinese." You'd think after 1997, as China's economy boomed and Hong Kong prospered, that might shift. It went the opposite direction. By 2015, people under 30 rated their Hong Kong identity at 7.9 out of 10, but their Chinese identity at just 4.9. Among 18 to 29 year olds in 2013, a staggering 84.3% identified exclusively as Hong Kong rather than Chinese.

Meanwhile in Britain, Eurobarometer surveys showed we were among the least likely in the EU to feel European. Only about 3.5% of British citizens described themselves primarily as European. We were in the club for four decades, but we never really felt like members.

What fascinates me about these parallel trajectories is this: in both cases, populations were supposed to integrate into larger political projects, one country two systems for Hong Kong, ever closer union for Britain, but the local identities intensified instead of dissolving.

Here's where the stories diverge in a way that matters. Hong Kong's identity crisis happened without a vote. Hongkongers were subjects of a negotiation between London and Beijing, not participants. Their sense of self evolved around an imposed settlement. When that settlement started visibly breaking down in the 2010s, with massive protests in 2014 and 2019, the only real option was literal exit.